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Abstract 
GDP figures for Africa are unreliable. More dependable information can be 
found in government expenditure and international trade records. These 
records, though, provide little insight into non-market output. In this paper an 
attempt is made to draw explicit conjectures on real output per head in pre-
independence Africa on the basis of trade data so that conjectures can be 
established about Africa’s long-run growth. Two alternative approaches are 
considered. One estimates per capita GDP by assuming no increase in output 
per head outside the tradable sector, for which the purchasing power of per 
capita exports is accepted as a proxy. Another approach establishes an 
econometric association between real per capita GDP and the income terms of 
trade per head for 1950-1990 and, on the basis of the prediction equation’s 
parameters and the values of the RHS variables, infers real output per head for 
1870-1938. Trends in real output per head are then drawn for Africa (and its 
main regions). By comparing these trends with those from other developing 
regions, some conjectures about Africa’s relative position over time are put 
forward. It emerges that economic growth started earlier than usually assumed 
and there is continuity in growth before and after colonial independence. Sub-
Saharan Africa’s retardation is a gradual process, as growing and falling behind 
took place simultaneously. But it is in the period 1975-1995 when the worst 
setback in modern Africa’s history took place. 
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ABSTRACT  
GDP figures for Africa are unreliable. More dependable information can be 
found in government expenditure and international trade records. These records, 
though, provide little insight into non-market output. In this paper an attempt is made 
to draw explicit conjectures on real output per head in pre-independence Africa on the 
basis of trade data so that conjectures can be established about Africa’s long-run 
growth. Two alternative approaches are considered. One estimates per capita GDP by 
assuming no increase in output per head outside the tradable sector, for which the 
purchasing power of per capita exports is accepted as a proxy. Another approach 
establishes an econometric association between real per capita GDP and the income 
terms of trade per head for 1950-1990 and, on the basis of the prediction equation’s 
parameters and the values of the RHS variables, infers real output per head for 1870-
1938. Trends in real output per head are then drawn for Africa (and its main regions). 
By comparing these trends with those from other developing regions, some 
conjectures about Africa’s relative position over time are put forward. It emerges that 
economic growth started earlier than usually assumed and there is continuity in 
growth before and after colonial independence. Sub-Saharan Africa’s retardation is a 
gradual process, as growing and falling behind took place simultaneously. But it is in 
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Introduction 
How has Africa performed over the long run and how does its performance 
compare with other developing regions? Economists have addressed these questions 
mainly for the recent past, and only occasionally ventured beyond the half-century 
since independence, c. 1960. As a result, they have concluded that Africa failed to 
grow in the long run (Jerven 2010). Lack of hard empirical evidence has not prevented 
the emergence of explicit thought-provoking hypotheses about the causes of Africa’s 
long-term retardation (Acemoglu and Robinson 2010, Bates et al. 2007, Heldring and 
Robinson 2012, Nunn 2008). Often, however, these writers are guilty of what Gareth 
Austin has labelled a ‘compression of history’ (Austin 2008). Economic historians have 
only recently begun to challenge this linear and deterministic approach to history by 
quantitatively investigating Africa’s long-run economic performance (Fourie and van 
Zanden 2012, Jerven 2010, 2011a, 2011b, Smits 2006).  
 
Unfortunately, African GDP figures are very unreliable, even for the present 
day. The most dependable information can be found in government expenditure and 
international trade records. However, assessing non-market outputs presents a major 
challenge for constructing modern national accounts (Jerven 2009, 2011c). For the pre-
independence era, it is impossible to construct an accurate picture of the size of 
domestic market activity, but most of the data that is available belongs to market 
activity. Non-marketed output is completely unknown (Austin 2008).  
 
In this paper an attempt is made to draw explicit quantitative conjectures on 
long-run trends in real output per head on the basis of international trade data. I share 
Angus Maddison’s (2007) view that quantification clarifies issues as it sharpens 
scholarly debate and is contestable. Furthermore, in the absence of proper ‘data’ 
(Austin 2008), it stimulates research by providing explicit testable hypotheses. As a 
consensus seems to exist that “specialization for export production is at the heart of 
Africa’s growth episodes” (Jerven 2010: 130), I rely on foreign trade data as the most 
suitable way to build quantitative conjectures about long-run growth in Africa. 
Specifically, to proxy GDP per head, I will rely on the income terms of trade (that is, the 
value of exports per head deflated by the price of imports) per person, which 
measures the purchasing power of exports in terms of imports.  
 
Among the findings that can be highlighted, economic growth appears to have 
started earlier than is usually assumed, and there is continuity in growth before and 
after independence from colonialism. Sub-Saharan Africa’s retardation emerges as a 
gradual process, as growth and falling behind took place simultaneously. However, it is 
in the period 1975-1995 when the major growth setback took place in Africa’s modern 
history. 
 
Pre-Independence Africa’s Real Per Capita GDP:  Available Estimates and 
Conjectures 
 
Comparable GDP per head estimates, even crude and debatable, are available 
for Africa in the second half of the 20th century (Penn World Tables 2012, World Bank 
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Indicators 2012), among which the more comprehensive dataset is provided for 1950-
2008 by Maddison (2006, 2010), who expressed them in Geary-Khamis 1990 dollars, 
and have been yearly updated by the Conference Board (2012).  
 
Prior to 1950 GDP estimates are scant. There are only a few countries for which 
GDP estimates are available and most of them are in North Africa.  Maddison (2006: 
577-580) constructed crude benchmark estimates on the basis of Amin’s (1966) figures 
for Algeria (1870, 1880, 1913, 1920, 1930, 1950), Morocco (1870, 1913, 1950), and 
Tunisia (1870, 1913, 1950). For Egypt, Maddison (2006: 577) relied on Hansen’s (1979, 
1991) and Hansen and Marzouk’s (1965) estimates, and dismissed Tarik Yousef’s 
(2002) money-based approach estimates as too low. In his survey on the Middle East’s 
real GDP per head, Sevket Pamuk (2006: 817) revised upwards Maddison’s estimates 
for Egypt in 1850 and 1913.  
 
South of the Sahara, the evidence is even thinner, with South Africa as an 
exception. South Africa’s Bureau of Census and Statistics (1960) provided estimates for 
1911-1959, partly used by Maddison (2006: 579), who complemented them with 
unpublished estimates by L.J. Fourie (1971) for 1920-1950, plus his own guesstimate 
for 1870. Recently, Johan Fourie and Jan-Luiten van Zanden (2012) spliced their 
detailed computations for the Cape Colony up to 1850 with different estimates for the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century and, then, with modern national accounts 
since 1946 (South African Reserve Bank 2011), in order to produce long-run series of 
real GDP per head up to 2008. Thus, they used the Bureau of Census and Statistics to 
1924 and, then, Schumann’s (1938) estimates to push them back to 1910, which were, 
in turn, projected backwards to 1850 with the unpublished estimates for the Cape 
Colony by Greyling et al. (2010). Interestingly, neither Maddison nor Fourie and van 
Zanden were aware of the revision of the Bureau of Census and Statistics figures 
carried out by J.J. Stadler (1963), who produced nominal GDP, rather than relying, as 
previous estimates, on NDP. Outside of South Africa, estimates are available for three 
Sub-Saharan countries: Benin, Kenya, and Ghana. In the case of Kenya, Arne Bigtsen 
(1986) constructed benchmark estimates for 1914, 1921, 1927, and 1936 on the basis 
of labour incomes, and GDP was obtained by assuming the labour share to be a fixed 
30 per cent. For Ghana, Robert Szereszewski (1965) derived benchmark per capita 
output estimates in 1891, 1901, and 1911 by assuming that consumption per head in 
the ‘traditional’ sector was stable over time and any intensive growth (namely, per 
head) depended exclusively on the ‘modern’ sector. Using Szereszewski’s estimates for 
1960, Maddison (2006) projected his GDP estimates backwards so he could obtain 
benchmark estimates back to 1891, expressed in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars. Recently, 
Morten Jerven (2011a) has constructed more sophisticated estimates for Ghana (1890-
1954). By accepting Szereszewski’s assumption that domestic consumption per head in 
the traditional sector was constant, and using physical indicators for government and 
non-traditional private consumption, gross capital formation, and exports and imports, 
Jerven weighted them with 1891 sector shares from Szereszewski in order to derive a 
volume index of GDP. Lastly, for Benin (formerly Dahomey), Patrick Manning (1982) 
employed the income terms of trade per person to proxy GDP per head over the long 
run. 
 
 5 
Estimating Real Output per Head in the Absence of Data: Indirect 
Approaches 
 
International trade is at the centre of historical growth episodes in Africa 
(Jerven 2010: 128, 130). Thus, in the broad absence of pre-1950 GDP data, it seems 
appropriate to use the available information on trade flows to proxy aggregate 
economic trends.2  
 
Two alternative indirect approaches appear feasible. The first one – which I will 
label the ‘dual’ approach- is grounded on Szereszewski’s (1965) method and assumes a 
dual economy, whose ‘traditional’ sector evolves along with population growth and 
whose ‘modern’ sector is closely connected to the international economy. The income 
terms of trade provide a measure of the performance of the modern sector. Thus, any 
increase in output per head results from the growth of the tradable sector of the 
economy (that is, the one producing goods and services traded internationally), which 
is captured by the purchasing power of per capita exports, weighted by the share of 
the tradable sector in the economy. The main challenge is establishing the relative 
size, in terms of GDP, of the tradable sector. The approach should also include a 
measure of potential trade spillovers to the rest of the economy. I have explored this 
approach to derive GDP estimates and arbitrarily assumed a share of the ‘modern’ 
sector equivalent to twice the export share in GDP, to allow for trade spillovers.3  
 
I construct the estimates backwards, starting from 1950, so I firstly obtain GDP 
per head for 1938. Thus, in order to derive per capita GDP of country i in 1938 I 
compute first the output per head in the 'modern', tradable sector:  ((ITT/N)i1938 / 
(ITT/N)i1950) * (Y/N)i1950 * (2 * (ITT/N)i1950 : (Y/N)i1950), where the 'modern' output per 
head for 1938 is obtained by multiplying per capita income for 1950, (Y/N)i1950, by the 
ratio of the per capita income terms of trade in 1938 to that of 1950, (ITT/N)i1938 / 
(ITT/N)i1950, and, then, weighted by the assumed share of the tradable sector in the 
whole economy (twice the export share of export/GDP ratio), 2 * (ITT/N)i1950 : 
(Y/N)i1950. The second term, captures output per head in the 'traditional' sector,  
(Y/N)i1950 * (1 - (2 * (ITT/N)i1950 : (Y/N)i1950), that is, it weights the level of GDP per head 
in 1950, (Y/N)i1950, by the share of the 'traditional' sector in the economy (=1- the share 
of the tradable sector), 1 - (2 * (ITT/N)i1950 : (Y/N)i1950). Thus, for 1938 GDP per head is 
generated as,  
 
Y/Ni1938 = ((ITT/N)i1938 / (ITT/N)i1950) * (Y/N)i1950 * (2 * (ITT/N)i1950 : (Y/N)i1950)  
+ (Y/N)i1950 * (1 - (2 * (ITT/N)i1950 : (Y/N)i1950))              [1] 
 
GDP per head computed this way for 1938 is used, in turn, to compute the GDP 
per head for 1929, and the same procedure is used all the way back to 1870. 
 
                                                        
2
 There are also unpublished GDP estimates for Sub-Saharan Africa (1910-1950) by Jan-Pieter Smits 
(2006). 
3
 Dalton (1976: 71, Table 5) provides the share of employment in the tradable sector that shows a 
reasonable association (a correlation coefficient of 0.5) with my estimates of relative size of the tradable 
sector (twice the export to GDP ratio). 
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A major objection to this approach results from the implicit assumption of zero 
price and income elasticities of demand for goods produced in the non-tradable 
sector. Why should it be assumed that consumers do not react to changes in relative 
prices of goods or in their disposable income? Moreover, why should we assume that 
output per head did not grow in the ‘traditional’ or ‘domestic’ sector? As Wolfgang 
Stolper (1966) put it, in the absence of a Malthusian scenario, there is no reason to 
assume that all increase in output per head results exclusively from the modern sector 
(quoted in Jerven 2011b). . Moreover, there is evidence suggesting productivity growth 
in the subsistence sector. People grew taller, the frequency of famines declined, 
markets became integrated largely because of railway infrastructure, and new 
production techniques enter the market.4 
 
The astringent assumptions underlying the ‘dual economy’ approach have led 
me to explore another alternative, that I will call the ‘econometric’ approach. This 
approach consists of establishing an association between per capita GDP and the 
income terms of trade per capita, plus other control variables, on the basis of the 
available evidence for the post-1950 era and, then, inferring real GDP per head for 
earlier years with the resulting parameters and the historical values of the right-hand-
side variables.  
 
log Y = a1 log ITT + a2 log ITT
2 + a3 RE+ a4 Location + a5 Colonial + a6 Region  [2] 
 
Using a pool regression with nine cross-sections (for those years ending in 0 
and 5 between 1950 and 1990) and fixed time effects, the log of GDP per head, log Y 
(provided in Maddison 2010), was regressed on the log of per capita income terms of 
trade, log ITT -computed by deflating African countries’ nominal export values with the 
industrial countries’ export unit values (taken from IMF 2003) and then divided by the 
countries’ population (from Maddison 2010); its quadratic term, log ITT2, in order to 
allow for non-linearities; and dummy variables to capture: 
 
•  Location, namely, whether a country is coastal (value 1) or landlocked 
(value 0),  
• Resource endowment (RE), that is,  resource rich (value 1) or poor 
(value 0) (from Collier and O’Connell 2008) 
• Colonial legacy, in other words, whether it had a British or a French 
colonial background (value 1, if former French (or British) colony; 0, 
otherwise) (Bertocchi and Canova 2002) 
• Region of the main  five African ones (north, central, east, west, and 
southern) in which the country is located.5  
 
The econometric results show a good fit that explains three-fourths of the 
variance (Table 1). Only the regional dummy for the North appears to be significant, 
and both geographical variables (location and resource endowment) interact 
significantly with the income terms of trade, negatively in the case of resource 
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 I owe this remark to Ewout Frankema 
5
 The only exception has been including Mauritania in West Africa rather than in North Africa, as defined 
by the ADB. 
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abundance and positively in the case of coastal location –implying that, for a given ITT 
per head, per capita income was lower in resource rich countries and higher in coastal 
ones.6  
 
Thus, under the arbitrary assumption that the econometric relationship derived 
for the period 1950-1990 remained stable over time, GDP per head volumes were 
obtained by multiplying the parameters from the equation’s right-hand side variables 
by the values of each independent variable for African countries at benchmark years 
over the period 1870-1950.7  
 
Since pre-1950 trade data corresponds to colonial boundaries a conversion to 
the independent countries was made. This implied that, for example, within French 
West and Equatorial Africa similar income volumes were assigned to all countries that 
only differed depending whether the country was coastal and resource rich.  
 
GDP per head at 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars for 1870-1938 was, then, derived 
by projecting Maddison’s (2010) levels for the 1950 benchmark with these volume 
indices.8  
 
It must be remembered that the resulting estimates, as in the case of those 
derived via the ‘dual’ approach, should only be taken as quantitative conjectures on 
real output per head. These are useful in allowing us to generate a set of explicit 
hypotheses about the performance of pre-independence Africa, which should then be 
tested in future research.9 
 
The income terms of trade for the period 1870-1938 were computed by 
deflating export values with import prices. Current price exports come from Hanson 
(1980) for 1860-1900 and Bairoch and Etemad (1985) for 1860-1938 –with some log-
linear interpolations for missing values in 1870 and 1890-, completed with Banks 
(2010) for Liberia and Lains (2003) for the Portuguese colonies (Angola, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique, and Sao Tomé and Principe), and, from 1913 onwards, the League of 
Nations (1927-1943).  Export values were, then, deflated with the British export price 
index (Mitchell 1988) in order to obtain the income terms of trade, and divided by 
                                                        
6
 I have replicated the econometric exercise for 1960-1990 in order to see how the prediction fits the 
1950-1960 period. The resulting values for the equation’s parameter are very close to those obtained 
for the 1950-1990, so the results from the original exercise appear to be robust. See Appendix B, Table 
B.2 
7
 The choice of 1990 as the end point for the regression is certainly arguable. Since 1990 can be 
regarded as close to the end of the economic collapse in many countries, missing the post-1990 
recovery years may bias the estimates. However, when choosing 1950-1990 for the econometric 
estimates my purpose was to avoid the AIDS-HIV era just in case it represented a regime shift. It is worth 
stressing that period fixed effects are used in the econometric estimates and that in the backward 
prediction I corrected the constant with the coefficient for the period effect in 1950. Thus, the strong 
assumption underlying the estimates, namely that the structural relationship between GDP per head 
and income terms of trade per head for the post-1950 period holds for the pre-1950 era is softened. 
8
 The backward projection of Maddison’s per capita GDP for 1950 with these volume indices increased 
the variance in income levels within both French West and Equatorial African countries.  
9
 The uncertainty about 1950 GDP levels in Sub-Saharan Africa no doubt increases the error margins of 
these conjectural estimates (Jerven 2012b). 
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population.10 Population data for Sub-Saharan Africa come from Mitchell (1993); Smits 
(private communication), for the early twentieth century; completed with Banks 
(2010), for Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, and Sierra Leone; Fargues (1986), for Algeria and 
Tunisia; Feinstein (2005) for South Africa; and Maddison (2006), for Egypt and Ghana. 
Missing population observations for Sub-Saharan African countries in the late 
nineteenth century were filled, assuming that average growth rates held in the 
neighbouring region. A caveat about the crude population figures used here is needed. 
On-going research on population trends shows the actual lack of knowledge on the 
colonial period. Manning (2010), on the basis of India’s experience, suggests that 
population growth has been wildly overestimated and, therefore, if mid-twentieth 
century population figures are accepted, their levels in the colonial period were higher 
than assumed. Frankema and Jerven (2012) have challenged Manning’s assumption 
that population levels of the 1950s are reliable, suggesting that they maybe 
underestimated as well, and pointing out that India, as a land scarce country, is not a 
good proxy for natural resource abundant Africa and, consequently, colonial 
population growth might have been faster than Manning reckoned. Therefore, the 
uncertainty about the available population figures represents an additional weakness 
of my conjectural per capita output estimates. 
 
Some assumptions were needed to fill missing values of GDP per head for some 
countries. Following Maddison’s approach, I assumed that growth trends in missing 
countries were similar to those of their neighbours. In the case of French Equatorial 
Africa (CAR, Congo, Gabon, and Chad), over 1870-1929, I assumed they grew as similar 
countries (coastal or landlocked, resource abundant or scarce) in French West Africa. 
Similarly, during the same period, Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau, and Togo were assumed 
to grow at the same rate of similar countries in West French Africa. Liberia was 
assumed to evolve as Sierra Leone over 1900-1913. In East Africa, I accepted Uganda’s 
pace of growth for Rwanda and Burundi (1913-1929) while Kenya’s pace of growth 
during 1870-1913 was assumed to be similar to Tanzania’s. Also, Ethiopia and Sudan 
were assumed to evolve as Egypt over 1870-1913. In southern Africa, Mozambique 
was accepted to evolve as Angola (1870-1900), and Zambia and Malawi (1913-1929) as 
Zimbabwe. Lastly, in the cases of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (1913-1938), and 
Namibia (1870-1913), I accepted the growth rate for South Africa. 
 
I have further assumed a lower bound for per capita GDP set at Geary-Khamis 
1990 $ 300, which represents a basic level of physiological subsistence (Milanovic et al. 
2011, Sagar and Najam 1998), lower than the World Bank’s one dollar a day extreme 
poverty threshold and Maddison’s (2006) subsistence minimum of G-K 1990 $ 400 per 
head. This ’floor’ for per capita income, which, no doubt, truncates the data set at the 
bottom, allows the inclusion of countries in years for which no data exist. Pritchett 
(1997: 7) alternatively used Geary-Khamis 1985 $ 250 as a lower bound for income per 
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 In addition to the fact that Britain represented the main source of African imports, the reason why I 
chose the British over a combination of export unit values for a group of colonial metropolis was to 
represent the purchasing power of African exports at international market prices and Britain’s export 
unit values were, at least, until the early 1930s, the closest proxy for it, while in France and Portugal 
export price distortions derived from protectionism. The poor quality of trade statistics in some 
metropolis (see, for example, Lains 1995 on Portugal) is an additional reason for my choice. Alternative 
estimates using both French and British export price indices do not change the results significantly. 
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head. The increase in the U.S. GDP deflator between 1985 and 1990 renders the 
difference between the two lower bounds negligible (1985 $ 250 are equivalent to 
1990 $ 293) (Johnston and Williamson 2002).  
 
Then, I completed the GDP data set for Africa with the available estimates for 
the northern region and South Africa. In the case of North Africa, I have accepted 
Maddison’s estimates with some interpolations on the basis of my own indirect 
estimates. Thus, for Algeria, I interpolated the levels for 1890 and 1900. For Tunisia, I 
accepted Maddison estimates for 1913 and interpolated the rest of the benchmarks. In 
the case of Morocco I found Maddison’s level for 1913 too low relative to Tunisia, and I 
have employed my own estimates. For Egypt, Maddison figures were also used but re-
scaled by accepting Pamuk’s (2006) level for 1950. I also used available estimates for 
South Africa. Specifically, I deflated Stadler’s (1963) nominal GDP estimates for 1913-
1950 with Facundo Alvaredo and Anthony Atkinson (2010) price index, and used 
population figures from Charles Feinstein (2005: 257-8) to derive per capita GDP. Then, 
the resulting estimates were projected backwards to 1870 with my own indirect 
estimates. 
 
Testing The Quantitative Conjectures 
I have tested the results from both the ‘dual’ and the ‘econometric’ approaches 
by comparing them with the available information on real wages. A previous caveat is 
needed: wages and output per head measure different aspects of economic activity 
and, therefore, discrepancies between them should be expected. Usually, the available 
data on wages refers to rates per day or week, with no information about the amount 
of work per year and its changes over time. But, even when they capture annual wage 
returns, they only represent returns to one factor of production, raw labour. GDP, in 
turn, comprises returns to all factors. Thus, changes in the functional distribution of 
income can explain their differences and, if measured in real terms, their different 
deflators.  
 
The path-breaking research on African real wages by Ewout Frankema and 
Marlous van Waijenburg (2012) provides ‘welfare ratios’–that is, a labourer’s full year 
earnings deflated by the annual cost of maintaining a family at subsistence level- for 
nine countries in British Africa. If we assume, along these authors, that a welfare ratio 
of 1 equals a subsistence per capita income level of 1990 Geary-Khamis $300 (see also 
Milanovic et al. 2011 and Allen 2012), and multiply each of the nine countries’ welfare 
ratios by $300, the resulting figures would provide a lower bound for income per head, 
as it derives exclusively from unskilled workers’ returns.11  Frankema and van 
Waijenburg’s (2012) welfare ratios suggest that countries in British Africa were above 
the physiological subsistence level or extreme poverty threshold of $300 for most of 
the colonial period. However, these welfare ratios derive exclusively from urban 
wages, which are part of the formal sector (Heldring and Robinson 2012), while a 
nominal urban-rural wage gap exists, and are computed by assuming full employment 
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 This assumption is supported by Allen’s recent finding that welfare ratio of 1 is roughly equivalent to 
the World Bank poverty line (Allen 2012). 
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(a working year of 312 days). Therefore, such ‘minimum’ income level may be 
exaggerated.12 In any case, the comparison with the ‘minimum’ or subsistence per 
capita income estimates, resulting from the welfare ratios, provides a crude test for 
my indirect estimates of real output per head. 
  
A glance at individual countries comparisons suggests that, if one allows for 
discrepancies deriving from income inequality, the alternative output per head 
estimates do not seem off the mark. A further implication appears to be that income 
inequality was not deep. The rationale for this assertion is that the output per head-
‘minimum’ income comparison implies confronting the bottom of the distribution (that 
is, the returns to raw labour captured by the welfare ratio) with the average (namely, 
output per capita, which, in addition to labourers’ incomes includes those incomes 
accruing to land and capital owners, for whom returns per head tend to be higher).  
 
As regards West Africa, evidence on four countries is available.13 In Sierra Leone 
the 1920s and, to less extent, the late 1930s would have witnessed episodes of 
growing inequality, unlike the rest of the considered period in which real output per 
head and ‘minimum’ income are close (Figure 1). As for Ghana, the gap between 
average and subsistence incomes seems to have widened between World War I and 
the Great Depression and, again, after World War II (Figure 2). These results appear to 
be consistent with the negative impact of World Wars on living standards across the 
British colonies (Frankema and van Waijenburg 2012). In the case of Nigeria, it is worth 
noting that the available welfare ratios correspond to the southern region, mostly to 
Lagos, that is, by far, the richest part of the country, so we can hypothesize that 
average national welfare ratios were significantly lower (Aka 1995, Timothy et al. 
2008). This may explain the high ‘subsistence’ income resulting from the welfare ratios 
prior to 1913 and, again, in the late 1930s, well above my output per head estimates. 
Nonetheless, it can be suggested that, in the 1920s and 1950s, discrepancies between 
output per head and ‘subsistence’ income imply phases of rising inequality (Figure 3). 
Lastly, from the results for The Gambia it could be hypothesized that there was an 
increase in inequality during the 1950s (Figure 4). 
 
In the case of East Africa, both for Kenya and Uganda, the differences between 
output per head and ‘subsistence’ income estimates point to higher inequality than in 
the cases considered for West Africa, with income distribution worsening from the 
1920s, to peak in the 1930s and, then, gradually declining during the 1950s (Figures 5 
and 6). The implicit inequality trends for Kenya are rather similar to those drawn by 
Bigsten’s (1986).14 In Tanzania output per head and welfare-ratio based income are 
highly coincidental suggesting low inequality although it appears to have increased 
during the 1940s and early 1950s (Figure 7).15 The contrast between high inequality in 
                                                        
12
 See, for example, the cases of 18
th
 century Italy or Spain, where days worked per year and occupied 
would have been just above half this figure (Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura 2012). In early 
modern England, however, the number of days worked per year increased remarkably during the 
‘industrious revolution’ that precede the Industrial Revolution (Allen and Weisdorf 2010). 
13
 The welfare ratios are expressed in maize except for The Gambia, for which it is rice. 
14
 In Bigsten’s (1986) Gini estimates, however, inequality increases over 1914-1950 to slightly decline 
and stabilize thereafter. 
15
 The welfare ratios are expressed in maize for Kenya and from millet for Tanzania and Uganda. 
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a settler economy like Kenya, and low inequality in peasant economies such as Ghana 
and Tanzania is consistent with the historical literature, but not the apparent high 
inequality in a peasant export economy such as Uganda’s (Austin 2008, Bowden et al. 
2008, Bowden and Mosley 2010). . It is worth bearing in mind the possible impact on 
living standards of immigration from Asia towards the East and Southern African 
countries that did not take place in West Africa (Frankema and van Waijenburg’s 
2012). 
 
In southern Africa, the case of Mauritius, a rich plantation economy, suggests 
high inequality throughout the considered period (Figure 8).16  
 
A more comprehensive picture results from the whole British colony sample. 
Population-weighted levels of indirect real output per head and ‘subsistence’ incomes 
-based on welfare-ratio estimates are offered in Figure 9. With the exception of the 
year 1900, all series fluctuate between $500 and $800 during the period 1880-1960. 
This reinforces the view that the differences between returns to raw labour (captured 
by welfare ratios) and to all factors of production (captured by GDP) are not large and, 
to the extent that the functional distribution of income proxies personal income 
distribution, it can be hypothesized that income inequality was not very high. 
Nonetheless, the widening gap between output per head and ‘subsistence’ income 
between the eve of World War I and the Great Depression and, again, in the post-
World War II years, suggests the existence of phases in which inequality increased. 
However, the inclusion of Nigeria, a country with a large population – and whose 
welfare ratios seem over-exaggerated- conditions the results. So I replicated the 
comparison excluding Nigeria (Figure 10). In this case, my indirect output estimates 
provide higher levels than the ‘subsistence’ income estimates, but the hypothesised 
phases of increasing income inequality are mostly confirmed.  
 
All in all, the comparative exercise suggests that my real output per head 
estimates and the ‘subsistence’ incomes derived from Frankema and van Waijenburg’s 
(2012) welfare ratios seem reasonably consistent, with the latter perhaps upward 
biased as a result of its full employment assumption and its exclusive coverage of the 
urban sector.  
A second test derives from comparing the real output per head estimates with 
urbanization rates.17 The comparison is predicated on the high association economists 
have found between levels of urbanization and economic development. As 
urbanization goes hand-in-hand with expansion of the market, specialization, and 
incentives to innovate, it is associated with economic growth (Kuznets 1966, North 
1982). In figures 11 and 12 a direct, positive association, although not a particularly 
strong one, is found between urbanisation and output per head.  
 
                                                        
16
 In the case of Malawi, Frankema and van Waijenburg (2012) suggest wage labour was not widespread 
so other sources of income are not captured in their welfare ratios. Output per head levels were, in 
turn, very low, so the assumption of $300 ‘floor’ had to be applied. All this makes the comparison 
between output per head and ‘subsistence’ income inadequate here. 
17
 The urbanization rate has been derived from data on urban population at the Clio-Infra database and 
the population estimates in Prados de la Escosura (2012). 
 12
Furthermore, in an attempt to expand the contrast of my indirect output per 
head estimates, I have carried out comparisons between my estimates and those 
available for individual countries: Jerven’s (2011a) for Ghana, Fourie and van Zanden’s 
(2012) for South Africa, and Bigtsen’s (1986) for Kenya.  In the case of South Africa, my 
‘econometric’ estimates closely match the trends in Fourie and van Zanden’s series. 
The differences are the result of their reliance on Bureau of Census and Statistics 
(1960) estimates while I draw on the revised estimates of  Stadler (1963).The ‘dual’ 
estimates follow a more erratic path (Figure 13). As for Kenya, Bigtsen’s (1986) figures, 
based exclusively on labour incomes, neither match my indirect estimates nor those 
based on the welfare ratios, suggesting they are well off the mark (Figure 14). Lastly, 
the contrast with Jerven’s (2011a) estimates for Ghana, suggests that my 
‘econometric’ estimates follow a similar path up to World War I. But the estimates 
then diverge as Jerven’s figures show rapid acceleration in the early 1920s and then 
decline in the 1930s and 1940s, (Figure 15). Jerven’s increases in the early 1920s and 
steady declines up to 1950 seem, in my view, exaggerated and might be the result of 
the fixed early weights (1891) used to combine physical indicators in his estimates of 
non-domestic (‘non traditional’) consumption and capital formation.  
 
Long-Run Trends  
Trends in real GDP per head for pre-independence Africa and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, derived from my alternative estimates and from Madisson’s, are confronted in 
Figures 16-17 and their growth rates presented in Table 2. The new estimates revise 
downwards Maddison’s long-run growth for Africa, while increasing the level of 
income per head during the colonial period. Interestingly, neither the ‘econometric’ 
nor the ‘dual’ estimates support Maddison’s contention that Africa was close to 
minimum subsistence levels (1990 Geary-Khamis $ 400). 
 
Although the results of my alternative approaches are not far from each other, I 
tend to favour the ‘econometric’ estimates that seem, despite their simplicity, more 
sensitive to economic changes. This may result from the critical role international 
trade played in colonial Africa’s economic performance, as well as from avoiding the 
arbitrary assumption of no per capita growth in the ‘traditional’ sector of the economy 
(as is the case in the ‘dual’ estimates). The resulting differences are particularly 
noticeable during the Great Depression. There are also significant disparities in the 
‘dark’ statistical era up to 1900, for which the ‘dual’ approach suggests lower initial 
levels and faster growth. Thus, in order to facilitate comparisons, I will focus on the 
‘econometric’ estimate for the rest of the paper. 
 
A glance at Figure 18 and Table 3 (and Table B-3 and B-4 at country level) 
indicates that real output per head increased slowly up to 1900, and then accelerated 
up to World War I. After the set back of World War I and the 1920s, growth resumed 
its earlier pace in the 1930s and 1940s. The Golden Age (1950-1975) marks the peak of 
African growth, with a more intense pace in (most of) Sub-Saharan Africa during the 
1950s and in the North and West regions after 1960. Thus, continuity appears to exist 
between the colonial era and the post-independence years. The progress of the 1930s 
and 1940s was replicated and improved upon from 1950 onwards. Thus, the 
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quantitative conjectures support the view that the Golden Age is the culmination of a 
phase of sustained growth that can be traced back to 1900. Such a view contradicts 
the gloomy picture of Sub-Saharan African stagnation so often presented in the 
development economics literature.  
 
The growing European demand for tropical consumer products and industrial 
raw materials may have functioned as a stimulus for growth during the early twentieth 
century, to which mining exports contributed after 1930. Colonial administrations built 
infrastructural links between ports and production centres for cash crops and minerals 
in the interior with apparently a major impact on capital formation (Wood and Mayer 
2001). After independence, trade expansion, that brought with it an improvement in 
the net barter terms of trade, occurred between the mid-1960s and 1970s (Deaton 
1999, Bates et al. 2007), and the inflow of foreign capital contributed to a better 
resource allocation and to an increase in output (Rodrik 1998, Wood and Mayer 2001).  
 
The late 1970s until the mid-1990s were the so-called ‘lost decades’ of Sub--
Saharan Africa’s growth. In North Africa, declines in real per capita income only 
occurred during the decade of 1985-1995. For Africa as a whole, terms of trade 
deteriorated and capital flight took place from the late 1970s until the 1990s, which 
impacted negatively on aggregate performance. The period from 1996 to 2007 may 
represent a turning point in Africa’s economic performance as the pace of economic 
growth has picked up. 
 
Interestingly, a gradual decline in the dispersion of income levels occurred 
across Africa up to World War II (Figure 19). This tendency was reversed thereafter, 
accelerating between 1960 and 1975 and, again, from 1995 onwards. 
 
It is important to maintain a healthy scepticism about the comparability of 
economic performance indicators across space and time (Jerven 2012). Nevertheless, 
Africa’s long-run economic performance has to be viewed from a comparative 
perspective if we are to put forward at least some tentative hypotheses to encourage 
further research. Although this kind of exercise amounts, perhaps, to writing history 
backwards (Kelley et al. 1971), asking questions relevant for the present from a long-
run perspective forms the basis for a ‘new comparative’ approach to economic history 
(Hatton et al. 2007).  
 
When African regions, both North and South of the Sahara, are viewed from an 
international perspective, it appears that while the North declined relatively to the 
world average up to 1975, stabilizing thereafter, the South lost ground steadily until 
1929, stabilized during the middle decades of the twentieth century, and fell behind 
again between 1975 and 1995. The region has since maintained its relative position 
through the turn of the new century (Figure 20).  
 
Way behind Eastern Europe (including Russia) and Latin America, North Africa 
remained in third place of world developing regions, until it was recently over-taken by 
East Asia. Sub-Saharan Africa, in turn, which was on a similar income level as South and 
East Asia up to 1938, managed to forge ahead of Asia between the 1940s and 1960s. It 
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then fell behind after 1975, remaining at the bottom of developing regions pile by 
2007. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that the regions deterioration relative to the 
world average has been halted since 1995.  
 
A closer look at the regions that make up Sub-Saharan Africa shows that their 
performances diverged. Southern Africa is on top in terms of performance, while East 
Africa was at the bottom most of the time. Recently, Central Africa replaced East Africa 
as the worst performing region (Figure 21). East Africa is the only Sub-Saharan region 
that did not improve its relative performance during the middle decades of the 
twentieth century. An interesting picture that confounds the orthodox view of Africa’s 
long-term growth performance also emerges if we compare the performance of Sub-
Saharan Africa with Asia (excluding Japan). It is true, that the two regions have mostly 
vied for the bottom position in the world income per head tables, but it is important to 
note that the growth episodes of the middle decades of the twentieth century put 
Sub-Saharan Africa ahead of Asia. It was only after 1975 that Sub-Saharan Africa sunk 
firmly to the bottom of the world income league.  
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Table 1 Econometric Estimate 
Dependent Variable log (Y) 
Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant 6.482 48.389 
log (ITT) -0.280 -4.496 
Log (ITT)2 0.059 9.133 
RR * log (ITT) -0.026 -2.914 
COAST * log (ITT) 0.073 8.289 
NORTH 0.277 4.807 
British Colony 0.228 4.388 
French Colony 0.269 5.404 
Adjusted-R squared 0.752 
S.E. of regression 0.331 
 F-statistic 79.058 
Number of observations 387 
Notes: Pooled Ordinary Least Squares with period fixed effects 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
t-ratios in brackets 
 
Variable definitions 
Y: Per Capita GDP ((1990 Geary-Khamis $) (in logs) (Maddison 2010) 
ITT: Income Terms of Trade per Head (in logs) (IMF 2003 and Maddison 2010) 
RR: takes value 1 when a country is resource-rich and 0 otherwise (Collier and O'Connell (2008) 
COAST: takes value 1 when a country is coastal and 0 otherwise (Collier and O'Connell (2008) 
NORTH: takes value 1 when a country is located in North Africa and 0 otherwise 
British Colony: takes value 1 when a country was a British colony; 0, otherwise (Bertocchi and Canova 2002) 
French Colony: takes value 1 when a country was a French colony; 0, otherwise (Bertocchi and Canova 2002) 
 
Sources: See the text 
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Table 2 
Real Output Per Head Growth, 1870-1950: Alternative Estimates (%) 
  Econometric Approach           Dual Approach 
  
Maddison 
SSA Africa SSA Africa Africa 
1870-1880 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 
1880-1890 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.6 
1890-1900 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4 
1900-1913 0.7 0.8 1.6 1.4 0.4 
1913-1929 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 
1929-1938 0.8 0.6 0.9 0.9 
1938-1950 0.9 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.7 
1870-1900 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 
1900-1950 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.8 
1870-1950 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 
 
Sources: Maddison (2010) and see the text. 
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Table 3. Real GDP per head in Africa and its main regions 
Panel A: Levels 
North Africa Central Africa  Southern Africa West Africa East Africa SSA Africa 
1870 740 494 777 585 346 560 613 
1880 772 462 890 568 356 582 637 
1890 845 512 899 577 402 603 670 
1900 876 532 926 595 424 619 684 
1913 1021 516 1045 656 463 677 758 
1929 1101 505 1095 644 499 690 779 
1938 1117 559 1245 647 511 739 821 
1950 1133 657 1472 752 526 828 887 
1960 1328 832 1794 868 609 986 1054 
1975 1944 984 2361 1166 728 1267 1399 
1985 2752 925 2148 1006 686 1142 1457 
1995 2594 584 2000 1025 680 1056 1345 
2007 3721 728 2582 1498 918 1404 1814 
Panel B: Growth Rates (%) 
 
North Africa Central Africa  Southern Africa West Africa East Africa SSA Africa 
1870-1880 0.4 -0.7 1.4 -0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 
1880-1890 0.9 1.0 0.1 0.2 1.2 0.3 0.5 
1890-1900 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 
1900-1913 1.2 -0.2 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 
1913-1929 0.5 -0.1 0.3 -0.1 0.5 0.1 0.2 
1929-1938 0.2 1.1 1.4 0.0 0.2 0.8 0.6 
1938-1950 0.1 1.3 1.4 1.3 0.2 0.9 0.6 
1950-1960 1.6 2.4 2.0 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.7 
1960-1975 2.5 1.1 1.8 2.0 1.2 1.7 1.9 
1975-1985 3.5 -0.6 -0.9 -1.5 -0.6 -1.0 0.4 
1985-1995 -0.6 -4.6 -0.7 0.2 -0.1 -0.8 -0.8 
1995-2007 3.0 1.8 2.1 3.2 2.5 2.4 2.5 
        
1870-1900 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.4 
1900-1929 0.8 -0.2 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.4 0.4 
1929-1950 0.1 1.3 1.4 0.7 0.2 0.9 0.6 
1950-1975 2.2 1.6 1.9 1.8 1.3 1.7 1.8 
1975-1995 1.4 -2.6 -0.8 -0.6 -0.3 -0.9 -0.2 
1900-1950 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 
1950-2007 2.1 0.2 1.0 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.3 
        
1900-1975 1.1 0.8 1.2 0.9 0.7 1.0 1.0 
1975-2007 2.0 -0.9 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.8 
        
1870-2007 1.2 0.3 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 
Sources: See the text. Table B3 and Maddison (2010) 
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Figure 1. Welfare Ratios and Alternative Output per Head Estimates: Sierra Leone 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Welfare Ratios and Alternative Output per Head Estimates: Ghana 
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Figure 3. Welfare Ratios and Alternative Output per Head Estimates: Nigeria 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Welfare Ratios and Alternative Output per Head Estimates: Gambia 
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Figure 5. Welfare Ratios and Alternative Output per Head Estimates: Kenya 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Welfare Ratios and Alternative Output per Head Estimates: Uganda 
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Figure 7. Welfare Ratios and Alternative Output per Head Estimates: Tanzania 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Welfare Ratios and Alternative Output per Head Estimates: Mauritius 
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Figure 9. Welfare Ratios and Alternative Output per Head Estimates: British Africa’s 
Sample 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Welfare Ratios and Alternative Output per Head Estimates: British Africa 
Sample (excluding Nigeria) 
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Figure 11 Output per Head -‘econometric’ estimates- (vertical axis) v Urbanization 
Rates (%) (horizontal axis), 1900-1950 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12 Output per Head -‘dual’ estimates- (vertical axis) v Urbanization Rates (%) 
(horizontal axis), 1900-1950 
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Figure 13. Alternative Output per Head Estimates: South Africa 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Alternative Output per Head Estimates: Kenya 
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Figure 15. Alternative Output per Head Estimates: Ghana 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Alternative Output per Head Estimates: Africa 
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Figure 17. Alternative Output per Head Estimates: Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Trends in Real Output per Head in Africa and Its Main Regions, 1870-2007 
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Figure 19. Real Output per Head Dispersion in Africa and Its Main Regions, 1870-2007 
(coefficient of variation) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Trends in Real Output per Head: North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa in 
Comparative Perspective (World = 1) 
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Figure 21. Trends in Real Output per Head: Africa Regions in Comparative Perspective  
(World = 1) 
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Appendix A. African Regions 
 
Five regions are defined according the African Development Bank (with the 
exception of Mauritania which is assigned to West Africa and not to North Africa here). 
North Africa includes Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. Central Africa 
contains Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. East Africa comprises Burundi, Comoros, 
Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and 
Uganda (Comoros, Seychelles, and Somalia are excluded here due to lack of historical 
data. Ethiopia includes Eritrea, only independent since 1993). West Africa comprises 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
GuineaBissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and 
Togo. Lack of data prevents the inclusion of São Tomé and Principe. Southern Africa 
consists of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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Appendix B 
Estimating GDP Indirectly  
Table B.1 Summary Statistics of the Variables Used 
 
  Mean  Std. Dev.     
Y 1370.69 1280.86 
ITT 266.48 700.06 
COAST 0.65 0.48 
RR 0.28 0.45 
DUM_NORTH 0.12 0.32 
British Colony 0.42 0.49 
French Colony 0.40 0.49 
 
Variable definitions 
Y: Per Capita GDP ((1990 Geary-Khamis $) (in logs) (Maddison 2010) 
ITT: Income Terms of Trade per Head (in logs) (IMF 2003 and Maddison 2010) 
RR: takes value 1 when a country is resource-rich and 0 otherwise (Collier and O'Connell (2008) 
COAST: takes value 1 when a country is coastal and 0 otherwise (Collier and O'Connell (2008) 
NORTH: takes value 1 when a country is located in North Africa and 0 otherwise 
British Colony: takes value 1 when a country was a British colony; 0, otherwise (Bertocchi and Canova 2002) 
French Colony: takes value 1 when a country was a French colony; 0, otherwise (Bertocchi and Canova 2002) 
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Table B.2 A Robustness Test: Econometric Estimate for 1960-1990 
 
Dependent Variable log (Y) 
Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant 6.461 38.145 
log (ITT) -0.220 -2.867 
log(ITT)2 0.055 7.157 
RR * log(ITT) -0.028 -2.956 
COAST * log(ITT) 0.071 7.629 
NORTH 0.257 4.088 
British Colony 0.153 2.703 
French Colony 0.166 3.066 
Adjusted-R squared 0.788 
S.E. of regression 0.315 
 F-statistic 82.229 
Number of observations 301 
Notes: Pooled Ordinary Least Squares with period fixed effects 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
t-ratios in brackets 
 
Sources: See the text 
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Table B.3 Real GDP per Head in Africa, 1870-1950 (1990 Geary-Khamis $) 
1870 1880 1890 1900 1913 1925 1929 1933 1938 1950 
North Africa 740 772 845 876 1021 1048 1101 1077 1117 1133 
Algeria 715 792 957 1013 1163 1313 1377 1377 1357 1365 
Egypt 749 769 830 841 1041 1005 1007 1025 1052 1050 
Libya 577 592 639 648 802 774 776 747 849 857 
Morocco 772 785 809 842 883 924 1079 978 1080 1455 
Tunisia 637 711 757 814 883 997 1080 965 1044 1115 
Central Africa  494 462 512 532 516 502 505 490 559 657 
Cameroon 549 516 531 559 552 523 516 492 544 671 
CAR 607 582 593 615 609 587 582 592 608 772 
Chad 374 359 365 379 376 362 359 365 375 476 
Congo 872 819 843 887 876 830 820 844 880 1198 
DR Congo 300 300 400 414 394 394 411 393 489 570 
Gabon 2261 2125 2186 2301 2272 2154 2127 2190 2284 3108 
West Africa 585 568 577 595 656 646 644 576 647 752 
Benin 898 838 865 916 903 851 839 763 854 1084 
 Burkina Faso 415 398 405 420 416 401 398 381 402 474 
Cape Verde 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 400 450 
Côte d'Ivoire 863 805 831 879 867 817 806 733 820 1041 
Gambia 863 685 575 486 498 607 
Ghana 474 489 516 553 938 896 959 740 942 1122 
Guinea 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 303 
Guinea-Bissau 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
Liberia 568 568 757 922 931 896 888 999 1014 1055 
Mali 400 383 390 405 401 386 383 367 387 457 
Mauritania 390 367 377 397 392 372 367 339 373 464 
Niger 540 517 527 547 542 522 518 496 523 617 
Nigeria 590 565 558 570 647 661 671 595 666 753 
Senegal 1043 973 1005 1064 1049 988 974 887 992 1259 
Sierra Leone 506 511 592 543 482 631 656 
Togo 548 512 528 559 551 519 512 440 486 574 
S. Tomé & P. 961 1011 448 360 390 526 820 
East Africa 346 356 402 424 463 497 499 475 511 526 
Burundi 300 300 300 300 388 430 438 440 350 360 
Djibouti 1441 1500 
Ethiopia 300 300 369 383 436 413 410 405 437 390 
Kenya 374 382 396 420 419 513 526 503 570 651 
Réunion 1749 1689 1703 1698 1989 
 Rwanda 300 300 300 400 589 654 665 668 532 547 
Somalia 300 300 300 400 893 1093 1120 1081 1178 1057 
Sudan 441 541 544 564 642 701 706 616 709 821 
Tanzania 330 338 350 371 371 412 379 334 376 424 
Uganda 463 474 491 521 520 577 587 569 622 687 
Southern Africa 777 890 899 926 1045 1089 1095 995 1245 1472 
Angola 604 616 644 692 685 673 706 683 745 1052 
Botswana 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 349 
Lesotho 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 355 
Madagascar 586 592 603 621 670 898 765 753 835 951 
Malawi 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 324 
Mauritius 2494 2832 2471 2202 2230 2051 1981 1570 1839 2490 
Mozambique 1107 1129 1180 1268 1137 1092 1092 948 1065 1133 
Namibia 951 1166 1105 1050 2520 1804 1912 1058 1599 2160 
South Africa 1098 1346 1276 1213 1548 1605 1656 1490 1993 2535 
Swaziland 300 300 300 300 400 593 628 589 678 721 
Zambia 300 300 300 300 347 311 333 428 615 661 
Zimbabwe 300 300 300 400 812 728 779 710 903 701 
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Table B.4 Real GDP per Head Growth in Africa, 1870-1950 (%) 
 
 
1870-
1880 
1880-
1890 
1890-
1900 
1900-
1913 
1913-
1929 
1929-
1938 
1938-
1950 
1870-
1900 
1900-
1929 
1929-
1950 
1870-
1950 
North Africa 0.4 0.9 0.4 1.2 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.8 0.1 0.5 
Algeria 1.0 1.9 0.6 1.1 1.1 -0.2 0.0 1.2 1.1 0.0 0.8 
Egypt 0.3 0.8 0.1 1.6 -0.2 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 
Libya 0.3 0.8 0.1 1.6 -0.2 1.0 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.5 
Morocco 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 1.3 0.0 2.5 0.3 0.9 1.4 0.8 
Tunisia 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.6 1.3 -0.4 0.5 0.8 1.0 0.1 0.7 
Central Africa  -0.7 1.0 0.4 -0.2 -0.1 1.1 1.3 0.2 -0.2 1.3 0.4 
Cameroon -0.6 0.3 0.5 -0.1 -0.4 0.6 1.7 0.1 -0.3 1.2 0.3 
CAR -0.4 0.2 0.4 -0.1 -0.3 0.5 2.0 0.0 -0.2 1.3 0.3 
Chad -0.4 0.2 0.4 -0.1 -0.3 0.5 2.0 0.0 -0.2 1.3 0.3 
Congo -0.6 0.3 0.5 -0.1 -0.4 0.8 2.6 0.1 -0.3 1.8 0.4 
DR Congo 0.0 2.9 0.3 -0.4 0.3 1.9 1.3 1.1 0.0 1.6 0.8 
Gabon -0.6 0.3 0.5 -0.1 -0.4 0.8 2.6 0.1 -0.3 1.8 0.4 
West Africa -0.3 0.2 0.3 0.8 -0.1 0.0 1.3 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.3 
Benin -0.7 0.3 0.6 -0.1 -0.5 0.2 2.0 0.1 -0.3 1.2 0.2 
 Burkina Faso -0.4 0.2 0.4 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 1.4 0.0 -0.2 0.8 0.2 
Cape Verde 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.5 
Côte d'Ivoire -0.7 0.3 0.6 -0.1 -0.5 0.2 2.0 0.1 -0.3 1.2 0.2 
Gambia 
    
-2.5 -1.6 1.7 
  
0.3 
 
Ghana 0.3 0.5 0.7 4.1 0.1 -0.2 1.5 0.5 1.9 0.7 1.1 
Guinea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Guinea-Bissau 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Liberia 0.0 2.9 2.0 0.1 -0.3 1.5 0.3 1.6 -0.1 0.8 0.8 
Mali -0.4 0.2 0.4 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 1.4 0.0 -0.2 0.8 0.2 
Mauritania -0.6 0.3 0.5 -0.1 -0.4 0.2 1.8 0.1 -0.3 1.1 0.2 
Niger -0.4 0.2 0.4 -0.1 -0.3 0.1 1.4 0.0 -0.2 0.8 0.2 
Nigeria -0.4 -0.1 0.2 1.0 0.2 -0.1 1.0 -0.1 0.6 0.5 0.3 
Senegal -0.7 0.3 0.6 -0.1 -0.5 0.2 2.0 0.1 -0.3 1.2 0.2 
Sierra Leone -1.8 -1.2 -8.4 0.1 0.4 1.7 0.3 -3.8 0.2 0.9 -1.1 
Togo -0.7 0.3 0.6 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6 1.4 0.1 -0.3 0.5 0.1 
S. Tomé &P 
   
0.4 -6.4 4.2 3.7 
 
-3.4 3.9 
 
East Africa 0.3 1.2 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.5 
Burundi 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.8 -2.5 0.2 0.0 1.3 -0.9 0.2 
Ethiopia 0.0 2.1 0.4 1.0 -0.4 0.7 -0.9 0.8 0.2 -0.2 0.3 
Kenya 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.0 1.4 0.9 1.1 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.7 
Réunion 
     
0.1 1.3 
  
0.8 
 
 Rwanda 0.0 0.0 2.9 3.0 0.8 -2.5 0.2 1.0 1.8 -0.9 0.8 
Somalia 0.0 0.0 2.9 6.2 1.4 0.6 -0.9 1.0 3.5 -0.3 1.6 
Sudan 2.0 0.1 0.4 1.0 0.6 0.0 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 
Tanzania 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.1 -0.1 1.0 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.3 
Uganda 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.5 
Southern 
Africa 
1.4 0.1 0.3 0.9 0.3 1.4 1.4 0.6 0.6 1.4 0.8 
Angola 0.2 0.4 0.7 -0.1 0.2 0.6 2.9 0.5 0.1 1.9 0.7 
Botswana 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.2 
Lesotho 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.2 
Madagascar 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.1 0.2 0.7 1.0 0.6 
Malawi 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 
Mauritius 1.3 -1.4 -1.2 0.1 -0.7 -0.8 2.5 -0.4 -0.4 1.1 0.0 
Mozambique 0.2 0.4 0.7 -0.8 -0.3 -0.3 0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.2 0.0 
Namibia 2.0 -0.5 -0.5 6.7 -1.7 -2.0 2.5 0.3 2.1 0.6 1.0 
South Africa 2.0 -0.5 -0.5 1.9 0.4 2.1 2.0 0.3 1.1 2.0 1.0 
Swaziland 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 2.8 0.9 0.5 0.0 2.5 0.7 1.1 
Zambia 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 -0.3 6.8 0.6 0.0 0.4 3.3 1.0 
Zimbabwe 0.0 0.0 2.9 5.4 -0.3 1.6 -2.1 1.0 2.3 -0.5 1.1 
 
Sources: See the text. 
